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The ultimate concern of financial economists is that financial resources be allocated to the 
most promising investment opportunities. Given the limitations of the market caused by 
information asymmetry, institutional investors have played a central role among other 
investors in improving the efficient allocation of capital. However, the investment process 
undertaken by institutional investors are rarely studied in academic research. Despite 
increasing evidence showing strong personal ties between fund managers and public 
corporates (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy 2008; Coval and Moskowitz 2001) and in addition 
other researches indicate direct interactions between the above pair (Gantchev 2013; Edmans 
& Manso 2011), the relationship developed between fund managers and listed companies to 
increase transparency appears a difficult area for research.  
Since the establishment of modern finance, the main theme has been the belief that market is 
efficient.  It is believed that if the price of any stocks departs from its fair price, it would 
create an arbitrage opportunity, which would be immediately spotted and acted upon by 
rational investors and thus disappear quickly. Behavioural finance has succeeded in recent 
years because it successfully link market anomalies which are unable to be explained under 
EMH to investors’ behaviour such as overconfidence, optimism thinking, ambiguity aversion 
and indicates that behaviours of irrational investors cause the persistence of anomalies in the 
markets (Barberis &Thaler 2002).  However, the above two main themes did not consider the 
social character of investment process. Market efficiency is a dynamic process and 
institutional investors such as mutual funds, hedge funds and pension funds are promoting 
greater efficiency in their daily practice. Comparing to individual investors, it is institutional 
investors’ active interactions with listed companies which leads to effective information 
exchange and dissemination. 
Although individual and institutional investors share common criteria in deciding which 
corporates to invest in stock markets, such as dividends, expected returns and financial 
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stabilities (Lease et al. 1974), the process of decision making between these two groups is 
fundamentally different.  Individual investors are often viewed as ‘noisy’ investors due to 
their lack of timely information, investment knowledge and skills, whereas institutional 
investors are seen as ‘informed’ investors as a result of their expertise and information 
advantages over small investors. Accumulating evidence shows that institutional investors 
such as mutual fund, hedge fund and pension funds are more active in reducing information 
asymmetry between themselves and their investment targeting firms than individual investors 
(Lauren, Frazzini and Malloy 2008; Franks, Mayer and Rossi 2007). To cite only one 
example, Aberdeen asset management, one of UK’s largest fund managers describe their 
investment process on their website as that ‘our mainstream equity managers always visit 
companies before investing, making thousands of visits annually to existing and prospective 
holdings’. Moreover, institutional investors might actively interact with publically traded 
companies in order to achieve long-term returns in addition to their short-term goals such as 
to beat the market benchmark and stand out from their peers. In the UK fund market, 42% 
companies within fund managers’ portfolio are held for five years or more (IMA report, 
2011). Surprisingly, despite the large interest shown in institutional investors’ investment 
preferences in selecting satisfied companies, little has been done systemically in research on 
the frequent interactions between the above two parties. 
We propose a trust model (Figure 1) to capture such interactions between institutional 
investors and their targeting firms and to explain institutional investors’ decision-making 
process. Ryan and Buchholtz (2001) first used social trust theory to explain how individual 
investors make their investment decision in stock investment to overcome information 
asymmetry and to reduce risk. In their model, individual investors make investment decisions 
based on the generalized trust in market efficiency and managers’ conscientiousness coupled 
with each investor’s initial investment situation to form their situational trust in a particular 
targeting firm. However, institutional investors have been left out from their model.  To 
adjust the model to accommodate the investment behaviour of institutional investors is 
necessary for the following reasons: first, the differences in decision making process between 
institutional and individual investors need to be documented from a trust theory perspective. 
For instance, institutional investors usually have large position in many companies and have a 
strong incentive to monitor the performance of corporates and have the power to exert 
pressure on management when improvement can be made. Second, institutional investors in 
stock markets deal with intangible assets which requires information received over public 
corporations. Given the naturally inherited information asymmetry problem between the 
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owner and the user of information, rational investors would not be willing to participate if 
there is an absence of trust between investors and corporations. Finally, institutional investors 
are now the major force in the markets which is different from the market picture a decade 
ago, therefore this study will offer a wider impact on policy implication. Drawing on works 
in inter-organizational relationship, we argue that an investment decision on long a stock or 
short a stock is determined by presumed rule-based trust at initial stage and by confirmed 
relationship-based situational trust at the final stage.  The final stage dominates the decision 
making. Our model also describes the cycle of trust to reflect the dynamics of trust building 
in stock selection. We also explore other commonly recognised antecedents of inter-
organizational trust such as social ties, time horizon, power and resource dependence in the 
setting of stock investment (Zaheer & Harris 2006; MacDuffie 2011). Our model may help 
institutional investors to identify strategies for better trading performance and it may also 
help corporate executives to attract the kind of shareholders that are the most appropriate to 
their firms. Our model may also be useful to explain some long lasting puzzles such as home 
bias in international investors’ portfolios. The structure of the study is organized as follows: 
in Section I, we outline the differences in trading behaviour between individual and 
institutional investors. Section II develops the proposing trust model. Section III discusses 
each component in the model. In Section V, we provide implications and suggestions for 
further research. Section VI concludes.  
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